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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett
I. INTRODUCTION
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett was recently decided by the United States
Supreme Court.1 The fundamental question presented therein was whether a
union, through an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement
("CBA"), could waive an individual union member's right to pursue a federal
law remedy in court.2 The issue embedded within the case was whether labor
arbitration is an effective or proper forum for resolution of statutory claims,
particularly where a union, not the employee, is party to the arbitration.
This recent development delves into what effects a Supreme Court ruling
will have on labor law as a whole-in particular, the arbitrability of statutory
claims specifically included within a CBA. First, a discussion of the facts,
procedural history, and relevant background of the case is necessary. Then
the outcome of the case will briefly be discussed.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This section reviews the relatively complex facts of the case. It will also
review the procedural history of the litigation. After an overview of the facts
and procedural posture, the relevant pending issues presented by the case will
be analyzed.
A. Facts
Temco Services Industries ("Temco"), a building service and cleaning
contractor, employed the plaintiffs as night watchmen in a building owned by
14 Penn Plaza LLC and the Pennsylvania Building Company.3 The plaintiffs
were then transferred and designated as night porters and light duty cleaners
1 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). This recent development was
written while the decision was pending. Therefore, it is written in contemplation of the
Court's decision, rather than in response to it. However, an additional section added at
the end discusses the Court's opinion.
2 See Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007).
3 Id. at 90.
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but were assigned to the same office building.4 The plaintiffs contended that
this "transfer" was in fact a demotion based upon their age.
Plaintiffs, as members of Local 32BJ of the Service Employee
International Union ("Union"), were covered by a collective bargaining
agreement between their Union and the Realty Advisory Board on Labor
Relations, Inc. ("RAB"). 5 The CBA bargained for between the parties
contains a mandatory arbitration clause for discrimination claims, which
states in relevant part as follows:
There shall be no discrimination against any present or future employee by
reason of race, creed, color, age, disability, national origin, sex, union
membership, or any characteristic protected by law, including, but not
limited to, claims made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, the New York State Human Rights Laws, the New York City Human
Rights Code, New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, New Jersey
Conscientious Employee Protection Act, Connecticut Fair Employer
Practices Act, or any other similar laws, rules or regulations. All such
claims shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures (Articles
V and VI [of the CBA]) as the sole and exclusive remedy for violations.
Arbitrators shall apply appropriate law in rendering decisions based upon
claims of discrimination.6
The above provision seems to be a clear and unmistakable waiver of the
individual union member's right to bring an age discrimination claim in
court, as it details that the arbitration mechanism within the CBA are the
"sole and exclusive remedy for violations. ' '7
B. Procedural History
The plaintiffs filed grievances with their Union under the CBA, claiming
that "as the only building employees over the age of 50, they were
wrongfully transferred and denied overtime in violation of various provisions
of the CBA, including the provision that prohibited discrimination on the
4
Id.
5 Id. (clarifying that RAB is a multi-employer bargaining association made up of
companies in the real estate industry in New York City).
6 Id. at 90 (noting that since 1999 every CBA between the parties has included a
mandatory arbitration clause for discrimination claims).7 Id.
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basis of age."'8 The arbitrator subsequently heard the plaintiffs' claims in
eight separate arbitration hearings.9
The Union, shortly after the arbitration began, declined to pursue
plaintiffs' claims of age discrimination and wrongful transfer. 10 To this day,
the arbitrator has yet to hear the age discrimination claims. However, the
Union decided to pursue the claims of denial of overtime on behalf of all
plaintiffs and wrongful denial of promotion on behalf of Pyett. I I The
plaintiffs then filed an action against the Union, alleging that the Union "had
breached its duty of fair representation toward them by withdrawing their age
discrimination grievance from arbitration." 12 Subsequently, the arbitrator
denied all of the plaintiffs' claims in their entirety. 13
Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed charges of discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). In each case, the
EEOC "notified each plaintiff of his right to sue." 14 Following arbitration,
the plaintiffs discontinued their duty of fair representation ("DFR") claim
against the Union and their employers, 15 presumably due to the difficultly of
proving a DFR claim. 16 However, all of the plaintiffs maintained that their
claims for age discrimination remained viable despite the arbitrator's
decision. 
17
8 Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d at 90.
9 Id.
10 Id.
I Id. at 91 (noting that "[a]ccording to plaintiffs, the Union's counsel explained to
them that since the Union had consented to Spartan Security being brought into the
building, the Union could not contest their replacement as night watchmen by personnel
of Spartan Security.").
12 Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35952, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
This is commonly known as a "DFR" claim.
13 Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d at 91.
14 Id. (citations removed).
15 Pyett, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35952, at *7.
16 In order for an individual union member to prove that a union breached its DFR to
them, that individual must prove two things: (1) that the employer's action was against
the CBA, and (2) that the union acted with discrimination, in an arbitrary fashion, or in
bad faith in handling that member's grievance. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190
(1967). This is an extremely high burden for an individual union member to meet, as they
not only have to show that the union acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith, but
also that they would have won against the employer in the absence of the union's
misconduct.
17 Pyett, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35952, at *7.
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C. Lower Court Rulings and Basisfor Appeal
Pursuant to their right-to-sue notifications from the EEOC, plaintiffs
sued Temco, Pennsylvania Building Company, and 14 Penn Plaza LLC,
pursuing age discrimination claims.' 8 Defendants moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.19 Additionally,
defendants alternatively moved to compel arbitration under the CBA in an
attempt to remove the dispute from federal court and give it back to the
arbitrator.20 However, the district court denied both the motions.21
In regards to the motion for dismissal, the district court stated that the
plaintiffs had sufficiently pled to satisfy the lenient standards needed to
overcome a motion for dismissal, "as they allege that plaintiffs were over the
age of 40, that they were reassigned to positions which led to substantial
losses in income, and that their replacements were both younger and had less
seniority at the building."22 Basically, the court found that the plaintiffs gave
the defendants fair notice of their claims and the grounds upon which their
claims rested. 23 The district court also denied the defendants' motion to
compel arbitration.24 The Court concluded that "based largely on binding
Second Circuit precedent . . . . even a clear and unmistakable union-
negotiated wavier of a right to litigate certain federal and state statutory
claims in a judicial forum is unenforceable." 25
III. SECOND CIRCUIT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
On the defendants' appeal from the district court's decision, the Second
Circuit affirmed its earlier decision in Rogers v. New York University26 and
18 Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d at 91 (specifically alleging "that they had been transferred
from their positions and replaced by younger security officers in violation" of the
ADEA).
19 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
2 0 Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d at 91.
2 1Pyett, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35952, at *9-12.
22 Id. at *10-11 (noting that even though "plaintiffs clearly will need evidence
supporting these allegations to survive summary judgment, we cannot say that they have
failed to meet the notice pleading standard required at this stage.").
23 Id. (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)).
24 Pyett, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35952, at *1 1.
25 Id. at * 11-12 (citations removed).
26 Rogers v. N.Y. Univ., 220 F.3d 73, 75-77 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that an
arbitration provision in a CBA could not waive an employee's right to assert local, state,
and federal statutory employment discrimination claims in federal court).
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held "that mandatory arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements
are unenforceable to the extent they waive the rights of covered workers to a
judicial forum for federal statutory causes of action." 27 The Court denied the
defendants' assertion that the district court's decision relied on Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.28 and Rogers v. New York University29 without taking
into account the Supreme Court decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.30
The defendants argued that the Supreme Court overturned Gardner-
Denver in Gilmer.3 1 They further argued that while Gilmer "dealt only with
contracts signed by individuals and not CBAs" and "in Wright the Supreme
Court made clear its abandonment of Gardner-Denver's rule that a union
may only waive certain statutory rights related to collective activity. '32
However, the Second Circuit ultimately disagreed with the defendants'
contentions. 33
The court discussed its ruling in Rogers and stated that it "considered
two issues: whether a mandatory arbitration clause in a CBA is enforceable
generally, and whether the language of the particular clause at issue was a
'clear and unmistakable waiver' under Wright."'34 In Rogers, it held that
Gardner-Denver still governed arbitration provisions in CBA's despite the
Supreme Court's ruling in Gilmer.35 Further, "while Wright may have called
Gardner-Denver into question, it did not overrule it."'36
However, Supreme Court cases, such as Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
N.L.R.B.37 and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,38 have held that "union
officials may be bound by union-negotiated agreements to enforce no-strike
27 Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2007)
28 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
29 Rogers, 220 F.3d 73.
30 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
31 Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d at 92.
32 Id. (citations removed).
33 Id. (stating that "Rogers squarely decided that a union-negotiated mandatory
arbitration agreement purporting to waive a covered worker's right to a federal forum
with respect to statutory rights is unenforceable. We took full account of both Gilmer and
Wright and concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner-Denver remains
good law.").
34 Id. (quoting Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998)).
35 Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d at 92 (holding that Gilmer held that an employee could be
compelled to arbitrate an age discrimination claim if that individual agreed to waive his
individual right to a federal forum).
36 Rogers, 220 F.3d at 75.
37 Metro. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
38 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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agreements, and thus waive their right (under federal statutes) to be free of
anti-union discrimination. ' 39 The Second Circuit addressed Metropolitan
Edison, arguing that it supported Gardner-Denver in that unions "may waive
certain statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the right to
strike."'40 The Second Circuit also distinguished Circuit City from the
pending case in that it addressed an individual employment contract, rather
than a union-negotiated CBA.41
In concluding its affirmation of the district court's decision, the Second
Circuit stated that nothing "has changed in the nine years since Wright or the
seven years since Rogers that compels us to reverse our ruling in Rogers that
arbitration provisions contained in a CBA, which purport to waive
employees' rights to a federal forum with respect to statutory claims, are
unenforceable. '42 The Second Circuit then went on to note that this dispute
displays why the Supreme Court has been reluctant to decide this issue.43 "If,
as plaintiffs allege, the Union refused to submit the wrongful transfer claims
to arbitration because the Union had agreed to a new contract, the interests of
the Union and the interests of plaintiffs are clearly in conflict. ' '44
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S CONFLICTING HOLDINGS ON THE ISSUE
As displayed in the Second Circuit's discussion and reasoning, the
Supreme Court precedent has been arguably contradictory in the area of
waiver in an arbitration provision of a CBA when an individual's right to
bring a statutory claim is involved. Although the Court has clearly stated that
an individual can waive access to courts in favor of arbitration for statutory
claims, 45 the Court has been indecisive in determining whether the union can
collectively waive an individual union member's access to the courts for
those same statutory claims. However, despite this relative uncertainty, labor
and management have collectively determined that these arbitration clauses
39 Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d at 93.
40 Id. at 93 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974))
(emphasis in original).
41 Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d at 93 (stating that it "does not address the issue before us
now.").
42 Id. at 93-94.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 94 n.5 (stating that "the interests of the individual may be subordinated to
the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit.").
45 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (allowing waiver of
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are effective at saving costs while at the same time adequately protecting the
interests of the union members.46 These arbitration clauses have rapidly
appeared in union contracts in an attempt to control state and federal anti-
discrimination disputes. 47 The following sections are a survey of relevant
past Supreme Court precedent on the topic of mandatory arbitration of
statutory claims in the context of labor and employment law.
A. Early Fear of the Arbitration Forum
The Supreme Court, in Gardner-Denver Co., held that unions cannot
prospectively waive an individual employee's Title VII statutory rights to
bring suit in federal court in a CBA.48 In Gardner-Denver Co., an employee
filed a grievance with his union under the CBA, arguing that he had been
improperly dismissed on the basis of his race.49 The Union submitted the
employee's claim to arbitration but the arbitrator found against him.50 The
employee then filed suit in a federal district court under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.5 ' The employer countered by moving to dismiss based on the
fact that the arbitrator had already decided the merits of the case.5 2
The Court held that an individual employee does not waive a private
cause of action even though that employee first pursued the claim to a final
arbitration decision as required under a CBA.5 3 The Court contended that
choosing to submit the dispute to arbitration only bound the employee's
contractual rights, not his or her statutory rights.54 The Court also expressed
its concern that arbitrators are not qualified to decide statutory matters due to
the respective statutes' relative complexities and distance from the law of the
workplace.55 However, since 1974, the Supreme Court has taken a much
different route in terms of its approval of arbitration as a valid substitute for
litigation.
46 See Loren K. Allison & Eric H. J. Stahlhut, Arbitration and the ADA: Do the Two
Make Strange Bedfellows?, 37 REs GESTAE 168, 171-72 (1993).
4 7 Id. at 168.
48 See generally Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 46-60 (1974).
49 1d. at 39.
50 Id. at 42.
51 Id. at 43.
52 Id. at 55.
53 Id. at 49-51.
54 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 52.
55 Id. at 57 (stating their "mistrust" of arbitration as an adequate forum for statutory
claims due to the lack of experience of arbitrators, their limited ability to conduct fact
finding procedures, and the relative informality of the process).
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B. Subsequent Supreme Court Favor of Arbitration as an Effective
Forum for Dispute Resolution
More recently, the Supreme Court has been much more favorable
towards arbitration as a valid procedure for resolving legal disputes.56
Congress' enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provided the
Court with a vehicle to legitimize arbitration as a valid and adequate
substitute for traditional litigation.57 Even though the FAA deals squarely
(and exclusively) with individual contracts (such as contracts between an
employer and an individual employee with no union involvement), the
Supreme Court has used the same language in supporting FAA individual
arbitration as it has used to support union arbitration. 58 Some scholars have
even advocated the unification of FAA commercial arbitration law and labor
arbitration law,59 which the Supreme Court has been reluctant to do up to this
point.
Since the Court's ruling in Gardner-Denver, where the Court called into
question the validity of arbitration and arbitrators, the Court has started to
retract its initial fear of the supposed inadequacies of arbitration and has
since deemed arbitration an adequate substitute to litigation.60 The following
is a survey of the specific cases from the Supreme Court that are supportive
of the use of arbitration in labor and employment law.
In Metropolitan Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., the Supreme Court held that
unions may waive a member's statutorily protected rights, including the right
to strike during the contract term and the right to refuse to cross a lawful
picket line.61 The conflict arose when union officials were terminated for
violating a union negotiated no-strike agreement by striking and refusing to
56 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Sherason/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483
(1989) (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (enforcing an
agreement to arbitrate antitrust claims).
57 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2008) (authorizing federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements).
58 See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-86 (2002) (citing
various labor law arbitrability cases in deciding the arbitrability of an individual
employment contract under the FAA).
59 See, e.g., Stephen L. Hayford, Unification of the Law of Labor Arbitration and
Commercial Arbitration: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 52 BAYLOR L. REv. 781
(2000) (advocating unification of the law or labor arbitration and the law of commercial
arbitration developed under the FAA).
60 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628 (stating that "[b]y agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.").
61 See Metro. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 460 U.S. 693, 705-06 (1983).
648
[Vol. 24:3 20091
14 PENN PLAZA LLC V. PYEIT
cross a picket line. 62 The union officials filed suit claiming that they were
unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of union membership.63
The Court held that union officials may be bound by union-negotiated
no-strike agreements.64 Therefore, the union can collectively waive an
individual union official's right under a federal statute to be free from anti-
union discrimination.65 Such waivers are valid because they rest on the
premise of fair representation and presuppose that the selection of a
bargaining representative remains free. 66 Simply put, if the union members
do not like union leadership, they can vote out them out pursuant to
guidelines of the NLRA.6 7 However, Metropolitan Edison may be cabined
by the fact that it dealt with a collective federal statutory right of union
members, as opposed to an individual's federal statutory right.68
Later, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court
held that an individual employee's arbitration agreement making age
discrimination claims subject to arbitration was enforceable. 69 The Court
relied on the FAA to hold that an age discrimination claim under a federal
statute can be subjected to compulsory arbitration. 70 The Court was not
62 Id. at 696-97.
63 Id. at 697. It is an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act to
discriminate on the basis of union membership. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2008) (stating
that it "shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to .... by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.").
64 Metro. Edison, 460 U.S. at 705-06.
65 Id. (explaining that "a union may bargain away its members' economic rights, but
it may not surrender rights that impair the employees' choice of their bargaining
representative.").
66 Id. at 706 (noting that "[s]uch a waiver imposes no constraints on the employees'
ability to choose which union will represent them .... It merely requires union officials
to take steps that are ancillary to the union's promise not to strike and provides the
employer with an additional means of enforcing this promise.").
6 7 Id.
68 For an explanation of this concept, see Janet McEneaney, Arbitration of Statutory
Claims in a Union Setting: History, Controversy and a Simpler Solution, 15 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 137, 140 (1997) (stating that collective rights are conferred to
employees "to foster the processes of bargaining and properly may be exercised or
relinquished by the union .... to obtain economic benefits for union members. Title VII.
... concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employment
opportunities.").
69 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991).
70 Id. at 35 (noting that there is nothing in the Age Discrimination Enforcement Act
or its legislative history that precluded arbitration).
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swayed by the notion that there is often a discrepancy between the bargaining
power of an individual employee and an employer.71
The Court confronted and discussed the two major differences between
the Gilmer and Gardner-Denver lines of cases and their applications. 72 First,
the Court distinguished its earlier decision in Gardner-Denver by clarifying
that it did not involve the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory
claims; rather, it decided "whether arbitration of contract-based claims
precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims. '73 Second, the
Court noted the differences between union CBA's, which are governed by
the Labor Management Relations Act, and individual employment contracts
which are governed by the FAA. 74
C. An Ambiguous Recent Supreme Court Decision
In the Supreme Court's most recent decision on the issue directly at
hand, the Court had an opportunity to clarify the confusion between Gilmer
and Gardner-Denver.75 In Wright v. Universal Marine Services Corp., a
CBA between a union and employer had a mandatory arbitration clause
which stated that it was "intended to cover all matters affecting wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment. '76 An individual employee
covered under the CBA filed discrimination charges against his employer
under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging that he had been
discriminated against on the basis of his disability. 77
The Court noted that under its past precedent, in order for a CBA to
effectively waive an individual union member's statutory right, the waiver
must be "clear and unmistakable. '78 The Court found that the specific
arbitration provision in the CBA at issue was not a clear and unmistakable
71 Id. at 33 (stating that "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a
sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the
employment context" because "the FAA's purpose was to place arbitration agreements
on the same footing as other contracts.").
72 Id. at 35.
73 Id. (stating additionally that "[s]ince the employees there had not agreed to
arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators were not authorized to resolve
such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably was held not to preclude
subsequent statutory actions.").
74 Id. (noting that in cases decided under the FAA there is a "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements.").
75 See generally Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
7 6 Id. at 73.
77 Id. at 75.
78 Id. at 79-80.
650
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waiver of a statutory right.79 Therefore, the Court stated that it would "not
reach the question whether such a [clear and unmistakable] wavier would be
enforceable. ' 80 However, the Court did acknowledge the conflict between
Gilmer and Gardner-Denver but gave little, if any, guidance for litigants
going forward. The Court hinted that there was doubt as to whether
"Gardner-Denver's seemingly absolute prohibition of union waiver of
employees' federal forum rights survives Gilmer.'' 81 However, the Court's
reasoning supremely relied on Metropolitan Edison, a decision that allowed
the prospective waiver of federal statutory rights in a CBA in favor of
arbitration. 82
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN PYE77- 3
In Pyett, the Supreme Court chose to finally face the issue that it
determined was not yet ripe for adjudication in Wright. Justice Thomas,
writing for the majority of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito, stated the question presented succinctly
as "whether a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and
unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate claims arising under the
[ADEA] is enforceable. '84 The Court granted certiorari "to address the issue
left unresolved in Wright" and ultimately reversed the holding of the Second
Circuit.85 The Court held that a CBA "that clearly and unmistakably requires
union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of
federal law."86
The Court stated that the parties' decision to create an arbitration system
to decide statutory employment discrimination claims "is no different from
the many other decisions made in designing grievance machinery. 87
7 9 Id. at 80.
80 Id. at 82.
81 Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.
82 Id. at 79-80.
83 As stated in the Introduction, this recent development was written while the case
was still pending before the Supreme Court. Therefore, this section is meant to briefly
summarize the Court's decision and reasoning, but not meant as a full analysis of the
case.
84 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1461 (2009). Two dissenting
opinions were filed, one by Justice Stevens and one by Justice Souter, in which Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.
85 Id. at 1463.
86 Id. at 1474.
87 Id. at 1464.
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Therefore, since the judiciary "may not interfere in this bargained-for
exchange," the CBA's "provision must be honored unless the ADEA itself
removes this particular class of grievances from the NLRA's broad sweep." 88
The Court primarily relied on the fact that there is no evidence that Congress,
in enacting the ADEA, meant to preclude arbitration of claims under the
Act. 89
Thomas provided a clear, sweeping, and rather judicially-conservative
answer to the question presented by stating simply that:
The NLRA provided the Union and the RAB with statutory authority to
collectively bargain for arbitration of workplace discrimination claims, and
Congress did not terminate that authority with respect to federal age-
discrimination claims in the ADEA. Accordingly, there is no legal basis for
the Court to strike down the arbitration clause in this CBA, which is freely
negotiated by the Union and the RAB, and which clearly and unmistakably
requires respondents to arbitrate the age-discrimination claims at issue in
this appeal. Congress has chosen to allow arbitration of ADEA claims. The
Judiciary must respect that choice.90
In essence, the majority explicitly limited the holding in Gardner-Denver by
stating that it "is not as broad as respondents suggest." 91 The majority
clarified by asserting that although federal anti-discrimination rights may not
be prospectively waived, an agreement to arbitrate them is not a prospective
waiver.92 Further, the Court, showing its favor for arbitration, noted that an
"arbitrator's capacity to resolve complex questions of fact and law extends
with equal force to discrimination claims brought under the ADEA. ' 9
3
VII. CONCLUSION
This case was one of the more controversial cases the Court decided this
term. The ruling will affect the landscape of labor and employment law going
forward into this new century. Most employers and unions argued that if the
8 8 Id. at 1464-65.
89 Id. at 1465.
90 Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1466. However, the Court did acknowledge that "the Gardner-
Denver line of cases included broad dicta that was highly critical of the use of arbitration
for the vindication of statutory anti-discrimination rights." Id at 1469.
91 Id. at 1466. The Court later stated that "Gardner-Denver and its progeny thus do
not control the outcome where, as is the case here, the collective-bargaining agreement's
arbitration provision expressly covers both statutory and contractual discrimination
claims." Id. at 1468-69.
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judiciary does not enforce arbitration agreements in CBA's, all employees
will have a "second bite" at their statutory claims. 94 Such a hypothetical
seems inequitable in labor law which, by legislative design, champions
collective employee rights over individual employee rights. The arbitration
provisions were likely subject to intense collective bargaining and represent a
compromise between the employer and the employees as a group,
represented by a union. The Supreme Court resolved this dispute quite
clearly by holding that a union can waive an individual union member's
statutory right as long as there is an arbitration procedure involved. If
nothing else, the Court has provided certainty going forward for unions,
employers, union employees, and non-union employees considering
unionizing.
Kyle G. Baker
94 For a thorough analysis of this issue, see Daniel B. Moar, Arbitrating Hate: Why
Binding Arbitration of Discrimination Claims is Appropriate for Union Members, 10
DUQ. Bus. L.J. 47, 72 (2008) (stating that "[t]he reasoning in Gardner-Denver failed to
recognize that employers have no incentive to agree to the 'second apple' of arbitration if
employees are already guaranteed an 'apple' though the federal courts.").
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